# Governance Model

Dual-layer, time-weighted, execution-first.

Protocol coherence is steered by veLAIKA; project sovereignty runs on veTOKEN. Macro rails stay consistent while each community operates its own economy.

***

### Separation of concerns

* Protocol (veLAIKA): StakeOS gauge weights, global params (bribe windows/caps, bonding-curve presets, DAO activation rules), LaunchOS curation, protocol treasuries.
* Project (veTOKEN): local treasury spend, incentive schedules, bribe strategy, ShillOS budgets, upgrades/integrations.

***

### Quick reference — locking parameters

<table><thead><tr><th width="145.33984375">Parameter</th><th>veLAIKA</th><th>veTOKEN</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Minimum lock</strong></td><td>30 days</td><td>30 days</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Maximum lock</strong></td><td>4 years (1,460 days)</td><td>4 years (1,460 days)</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Voting power formula</strong></td><td>vePower = amount × 0.8 × (duration_days / 365)^1.322, capped at 5 × amount at 4 years</td><td>vePower = amount × 0.8 × (duration_days / 365)^1.322, capped at 5 × amount at 4 years</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Early exit</strong></td><td>penalty = amount × (remaining_days / total_days)</td><td>penalty = amount × (remaining_days / total_days)</td></tr></tbody></table>

***↝ Notes***

* The convex curve (exponent 1.322) rewards longer commitments more than linearly; the 0.8 factor calibrates the 1-year point.
* ve-assets are non-transferable; voting power decays as the lock approaches expiry. Extend/rel-lock to maintain vePower.
* Early-exit penalties are forfeited per policy (default: burned).<br>

***↝ Examples (veLAIKA)***

<mark style="color:yellow;">1,000 LAIKA locked</mark>&#x20;

* 30d → \~29 veLAIKA&#x20;
* 90d → \~126 veLAIKA&#x20;
* 180d → \~314 veLAIKA&#x20;
* 365d → 800 veLAIKA&#x20;
* 2y → \~2,000 veLAIKA&#x20;
* 4y → 5,000 veLAIKA (cap)

Early exit: lock 1,000 for 180d, exit at 90d → penalty = 1,000 × (90/180) = 500 forfeited; 500 returned; veLAIKA expires.

***

### Governance flows

#### <mark style="color:yellow;">**veLAIKA holders**</mark>

* Allocate weekly StakeOS emissions (gauges).
* Curate LaunchOS (commit–reveal; winner only revealed).
* Set protocol-wide params & fee routing schedules.
* Receive: proportional protocol revenue + bribes (epochic settlement).

#### <mark style="color:yellow;">**veTOKEN holders**</mark>

* Run their DAO (treasury, incentives, campaigns, upgrades).
* Tune bribe posture to attract veLAIKA votes to their pool.
* Receive: $LAIKA yield when their pool is funded + project-level distributions.
* Participate in LaunchOS curation (where enabled).

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/XUzSkedfhSX68eoM6Beb/blobs/rT6kasQOKpiCFNuID2SM/Laika%20Governance.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

***

### Rewards and distribution

Staker rewards are proportional to commitment:

```
user_yield = pool_emission × (user_vePower / total_pool_vePower)
```

This routes more value to organized, long-duration communities—not to mercenary TVL.

***

### Secret curation (LaunchOS)

* Commit–reveal with no interim tallies; only the winner is shown.
* Reduces sniping & metagaming; losing projects aren’t publicly exposed and can reapply.
* Aligned voters may receive alpha windows (policy-gated allowlists).

***

### Vote-to-earn incentives

* <mark style="color:yellow;">**Bribes:**</mark> any token can be posted to influence veLAIKA/veTOKEN direction; payouts pro-rata to supporting voters.
* <mark style="color:yellow;">**LaunchOS alpha:**</mark> early TGE intel/allowlist for aligned voters (per policy).
* <mark style="color:yellow;">**StakeOS perks:**</mark> enhanced multipliers or protocol top-ups to winning pools.